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Economic Discourse in Europe between Scholasticism and Mandeville: 
Convergence, Divergence and the Case of the Dutch Republic
Karel Davids
In the past few decades, research on the pre-Smithian period in the history of economic 
thought has vastly expanded. Numerous important and fruitful insights have emerged 
as a result. Historians have identifi ed several changes in economic thought before the 
end of eighteenth century that were scarcely less innovative that the contribution of 
Adam Smith himself. Among these changes were, for instance, the introduction of a 
quantity theory of money by the School of Salamanca, the development of a theory on 
private property in natural law doctrine by Grotius and Pufendorf, the growth of a ›sci-
ence of trade‹ in England or the elaboration of ideas on the ›liberty of trade‹ in France 
by Pierre de Boisguilbert and other political economists. Seminal changes in economic 
thought are nowadays situated at a much earlier point in time than used to be the case 
in older studies on the history of economic thought. Historians are moreover less prone 
to establish a direct connection between economic ideas and economic policies. Eco-
nomic policies are not merely seen as a simple refl ection of economic thought, and the 
evolution of economic thought is not reduced to the immediate product of economic, 
political and social circumstances but granted a certain degree of autonomy.1 The histo-
rian of economic thought Cosimo Perrotta has pushed this line of reasoning so far as 
to claim that economic thought in Europe even in the early eighteenth century was still 
haunted by the ancient ›fear of material goods‹ even though constant growth of wealth 
supposedly had already started in some places in Europe in the late Middle Ages.2 
In this article I want to pursue the analysis of economic discourse in the early modern 
period from a somewhat different angle. The aspect with which I am particularly con-
cerned, is the phenomenon of divergence and convergence in economic discourse both 
within and between countries of Europe between the sixteenth century and early eigh-
teenth centuries. By ›economic discourse‹ I mean discussions on economic issues con-
ducted in printed works such as in pamphlets, tracts, monographs, textbooks, or com-
mentaries in edited volumes. The historiography of discursive traditions before Adam 
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Smith really abounds with studies on common themes, or lines of thought, shared by 
thinkers in many different parts of Europe between about 1500 and 1700, such as scho-
lasticism, mercantilism, political economy, or the theory of natural law. Each of these 
bodies of thought enjoyed a substantial constituency in its day, to be sure, but none of 
them achieved during this period a clear predominance across Europe. The variety of 
ideas and vocabularies coexisting at any point in time was always much greater than a 
survey of separate strands of thinking might suggest. Economic discourse in Europe did 
in fact not follow a single, common path of development. It would be a futile exercise 
to devise a master narrative which would run straight from Renaissance Humanists 
and ascetic Protestants to the Mandevillian beehive and the Smithian invisible hand. 
However, divergence did not preclude affi nities and interconnections. Different bodies 
of thought still could be related in various kinds of ways. 
This article examines how and to what extent economic discourse in Europe be-
tween about 1500 and 1700 actually diverged or converged and by what factors these 
tendencies might be explained. The view which I wish particularly to qualify, is the 
thesis recently put forward by Cosimo Perrotta to the effect that the ancient ›distrust 
of material wealth‹, in spite of the mercantilist arguments to the contrary, remained 
the dominant attitude in European culture up to the Enlightenment. Perrotta relates 
this failure to adopt values more appropriate to the emerging capitalist economy to the 
sheer tenacity of old-established ideas, to the continued dominance of the landed ari-
stocracy as well as, in a sense, to the legacy of human evolution since the Neolithic era 
at large.3 I do not disagree with the suggestion as such that material wealth in Europe 
before the eighteenth century was not yet generally trusted. In this respect discursive 
traditions in Europe to some extent converged. But the reasons for the lack of trust were 
not exactly those which Perrotta suspected. To demonstrate this, I will devote special 
attention to the case of the Dutch Republic, which, for all its outstanding economic and 
cultural achievements during the early modern period, still forms a kind of black hole in 
the historiography of economic discursive traditions.4 Discourse in the Dutch Republic 
showed in fact much more convergence with traditions in the rest of Europe than one 
would expect. On the other hand, I would suggest that Perrotta’s thesis underestimates 
the degree of variation in economic discourse that actually emerged in the early mo-
dern period. Economic thought between c.1500 and 1700 began to show increasing 
divergence by country, language and social group. Having demonstrated fi rst the nature 
and extent of convergence and divergence in economic discourse in Europe between c. 
1500 and 1700, using the Netherlands as a test case, I will next turn to the question of 
their origins. Where did the tendencies of convergence and divergence come from? And 
why, more specifi cally, did economic discourse in the Dutch Republic at the end of the 
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seventeenth century develop in a different way than that in England? Those are the key 
questions which will be addressed in the fi nal section of this essay. 
 
1. Convergence and the Dutch Republic 
Let me take the aspect of convergence fi rst. The Dutch Republic forms a good test case, 
because it is the last place where one would expect convergence in economic thinking 
with the rest of Europe. The Dutch Republic was in the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries the most advanced capitalist economy in Europe and in contrast with nearly 
all other European societies at the time it was not dominated by a landed aristocracy.5 If 
there was one country in Europe before 1700 where old-established ideas in economic 
thought might have been discarded early and distrust of material wealth might been 
overcome, it was doubtless the Republic of the United Provinces.
 Yet, in many respects the Dutch Republic before 1700 did not show signifi cant 
deviations from discursive traditions in other countries at all. Economic discourse in 
the Netherlands diverged in reality much less from well-established traditions than the 
advanced capitalist nature of its economy might lead one to expect – on the assumption, 
at least, that the emergence of a capitalist economy indeed provided a more favourable 
context for a change in discourse than more traditional types of economy. Discourse in 
the Netherlands was in many ways not unlike discourse in other countries in Europe. 
Scholasticism, for instance, did not only for a long time exert a strong hold on Ca-
tholic countries of Europe, but at least up till the middle of the seventeenth century 
to some extent also provided a framework for economic discussions in the very state 
where the Reformed Church since about 1580 enjoyed the status of the public church. 
The most intense debate on an economic subject conducted in the Netherlands between 
the 1630s and the late 1650s revolved, as in scholastic economics, around an issue of 
distributive justice, namely the question of usury. The protracted discussions between 
ministers, theologians, legal experts and philologists, which partly were carried on in 
Latin and partly in Dutch, were not sparked by the general challenge posed by the rise 
of merchant capitalism per se but by the more specifi c question whether the activities of 
private and municipal pawnshops, which entailed the charging of interest, were morally 
admissible or not. Were pawnbrokers allowed to partake in the Lord’s Supper? The 
answers varied wildly. A treatise by a minister of the Reformed Church Johannes Clop-
penburgh, commissioned by the Synod of South Holland, argued that charging interest 
was, generally speaking, permissible but that the practices of private pawnbrokers had 
to be condemned. Orthodox theologians, entrenched in the university of Utrecht, were 
convinced that pawnbroking was not admissible at all and mainly appealed to scrip-
tural authority (divine law) to prove their point. The opposite position was defended 
by, among others, legal experts like Dirck Graswinckel and philologists like Claudius 
83Economic Discourse in Europe between Scholasticism and Mandeville
 6 J. D. Veegens: De banken van leening in Noord-Nederland tot het einde der achttiende eeuw, 
Rotterdam 1863, 125–266.
 7 R. Jütte: Poverty and Deviance in Early Modern Europe, Cambridge 1994, 169–177; C. Lis, H. 
Soly: Poverty and Capitalism in Pre-Industrial Europe, Brighton 1979, ch.3.
 8 D. V. Coornhert: Boeventucht ofte middelen tot mindering der schadelyke ledighganghers, Utrecht, 
1981 (15871).
 9 P. Spierenburg: »The Sociogenesis of Confi nement and its Development in Early Modern Europe«, 
in: P. Spierenburg (ed.): The Emergence of Carceral Institutions: Prisons, Galleys and Lunatic Asylums 
1550–1900, Rotterdam 1984, 15–42.
10 E. Beins: »Die Wirtschaftsethik der Calvinistischen Kirche der Niederlande 1565–1650«, in: 
Nederlandsch Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis 24 (1931), 82–156; P. J. Meertens: »Godefridus Cornelisz 
Udemans«, in: Nederlandsch Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis 28 (1936); J. C. Riemersma: Religious Fac-
tors in Early Dutch Capitalism 1550–1650, The Hague 1967.
11 Beins: »Die Wirtschaftsethik der Calvinistischen Kirche« (op. cit.), 95, 154 f.
Salmasius of the university of Leiden, who based their case on natural law as well as a 
different interpretation of the Scriptures.6
Turning from capital to labour, similarities between discourse in the Netherlands and 
discursive traditions in other countries again leap to the eye. The role of labour was 
mostly discussed from the perspective of poverty, idleness and vagrancy. In line with 
humanist thinking exemplifi ed by Juan Luís Vives and Thomas More7, Dutch writers 
in the late sixteenth century viewed the presence of able-bodied paupers as a threat to 
society, which should be fought with stern disciplinary measures. Idleness was perceived 
as a cause of mischief. Beggars and vagabonds were branded as criminals. Dirck Vol-
ckertsz Coornhert, who held the post of municipal secretary in Haarlem and Gouda, 
suggested in his Boeventucht (Discipline of Knaves) (1587) to prevent idleness by intro-
ducing a system of strict surveillance of potential local sluggards and by excluding all 
foreign beggars at the city gates, and to combat sloth and crime by sending able-bodied 
idlers to the galleys, compelling them to work in reclamation projects or locking them 
up in a prison where they would be forced to toil to earn their daily bread.8 Inspired 
by the ideas of Coornhert and other humanists, ›houses of correction‹ for beggars and 
vagrants were erected in nineteen towns in the Netherlands between the 1590s and the 
1660s. The assumption that the rise of this type of institutions was somehow related to 
the spread of a ›Protestant ethic‹ has proved to be groundless.9
Studies on Reformed doctrine and its practical application in the Netherlands be-
tween about 1570 and 1650 have shown in fact that the Dutch case did not represent 
a example of the Weberian ›Protestant ethic‹ at all.10 Ernst Beins long ago concluded 
that ›die Wirtschaftsethik der niederländischen calvinistischen Kirche‹ could only be 
regarded as ›eine recht unvollkommene Ethik der Kapitalismus‹.11 In this respect, too, 
economic discourse in the Dutch Republic was less out of step with the rest of Europe 
than the modern appearance of its economy would suggest. Calvinist ministers, elders 
and theologians in the Netherlands stressed the duty to work steadily and diligently, to 
be sure, but they saw such activity primarily as a means to provide for oneself and one’s 
family rather than as an instrument to maximize private wealth. Accumulation of riches 
was not regarded as a sign of election. The doctrine of predestination did not produce 
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a powerful incentive to get rich.12 God-fearing men would enjoy material prosperity13, 
so the common view went, but prosperity was not to be taken as certain indication that 
rich men were saved. 
Except to some degree for a brief period in the middle of the seventeenth century, 
Dutch merchant-writers generally had not much confi dence in the security of the foun-
dations of the prosperity of their Republic. While foreign authors looked with envy 
and wonder at Dutch economic achievements and determinedly sought to uncover the 
supposed ›secrets‹ of the success of their market economy in order to deduce some use-
ful lessons for the economic development of their own country14, the dominant mode 
in the economic discourse among this category of writers in the Netherlands itself was 
rather one of defensiveness. However attractive the Dutch were ›as a source of evidence‹ 
for mercantilist writers and political economists in England – in Joyce Appleby’s memo-
rable phrase –, the Dutch themselves were by no means convinced that they were the 
fortunate owners of the Holy Grail of economic growth. Once again we fi nd conver-
gence rather divergence between the Netherlands and other countries in Europe. The 
cause of this lack of confi dence was not, as Simon Schama would have it, an affl iction 
by the embarrassment of riches.15 Nor were the Dutch struck by a primordial ›fear of 
goods‹ or seized upon by a distrust of material wealth as such. The authors of the texts 
were after all merchants themselves. 
What emerges in these economic writings by merchant-authors, all composed in 
Dutch, is rather a powerful desire to protect the economic position of the Republic 
against its existing or potential competitors. The earliest example is the work of Willem 
Usselinx, a merchant from Antwerp who in 1591 had moved to Amsterdam. In the early 
1600s, Usselinx published a series of pamphlets warning against the economic conse-
quences of a peace between the Republic and Spain. The outbreak of peace would im-
ply not only that the United Provinces would suffer by the competition from the more 
advanced economy in the Spanish Netherlands but would also forfeit the possibilities 
of expansion into the western hemisphere. Usselinx argued that the optimal strategy 
to safeguard the wealth and power of the Republic was the establishment of colonies 
in the West-Indies and the Americas outside the territory dominated by Spain. These 
colonies, peopled with Indians and settlers from Holland and other areas in Continental 
Europe, would serve both as producers of raw materials and foodstuffs for the mother 
country and as markets for industrial products made in the Dutch Republic. Settlers 
would not be allowed to set up industries themselves or to trade with any other country 
than the Netherlands. Trade and shipping between the colonies and the metropolis, as 
well as the colonization effort itself, would be managed by a new trading company, the 
West-India Company. The American colonies and the Netherlands thus would form a 
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single, tightly knit economic system, enjoying maximum protection from competition 
from abroad.16
Similar opinions kept being voiced as the seventeenth century advanced. Around 
1660, colonization efforts at the other side of the Atlantic were viewed by many people 
in the Netherlands as a sovereign remedy for the economic ills at home. The anonymous 
author of a pamphlet published in 1659, ›t Verheerlickte Nederland door d’herstelde 
zee-vaart (Raising the Netherlands by the restoration of shipping) argued that the best 
way to improve the perceived dire situation of the Dutch economy and restore the pro-
sperity of the country was the establishment and expansion of colonies in the Americas, 
following the model of Spain, Portugal, France and England. Colonization in the New 
Netherlands, Florida and the Guyanas would open up vast possibilities for Dutch ship-
ping, trade, agriculture and industry, just as colonization in the Americas and the West 
Indies had yielded great riches for the Spaniards, the Portuguese, the French, and the 
English. Once a colonial empire had been created, trade and shipping would be less vul-
nerable to foreign intervention while profi ts would fl ow to the Netherlands itself. The 
main difference with Usselinx’s project was, that the author of this pamphlet thought 
that the leading role in these colonization efforts should not be played by a trading 
company, but by the States General and the States of Holland.17 The De la Court bro-
thers in their publications in the 1660s, too, were not averse from advocating protectio-
nist measures. Levying extra taxes on foreign goods was not a bad thing, they claimed, 
as long as it did not divert trade. Like Usselinx, they thought that the settlement of 
overseas colonies should be encouraged in the interest of the motherland.18 Authors 
from non-entrepreneurial backgrounds, notably the radical Amsterdam schoolmaster 
Franciscus van den Ende and the Mennonite ›projector‹ Pieter Cornelisz Plockhoy from 
Zeeland, joined in these discussions on colonization by designing plans to organize 
overseas settlements as an ideal political society and a social utopia.19 
When competition from England and Hamburg in trade and shipping became more 
intense and Colbert’s mercantilist programme in France in the late 1660s got into full 
swing, the protectionist position in economic discourse in the Netherlands received 
even more support. In contrast to the previous period, the focus of the discussions was 
now almost exclusively on policy measures in the home country itself.20 Willem van 
der Voort, a prominent Amsterdam merchant and Pieter de la Court’s brother-in-law, 
argued in 1671 that the Dutch should take care not to grant foreigners more favours 
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in trade and shipping than they received in return. Foreigners should be forbidden to 
import products other than those from the country of origin and to carry these goods 
in other ships than those owned in that country or in the Dutch Republic.21 At the very 
start of Louis XIV’s fi rst war against the United Provinces in 1672, Arend Tollenaer 
presented a set of ›articles of political faith‹ to the States of Holland, in which he argued 
that the protection of industry in Holland required not only that the old-established 
ban on the import of dyed and fi nished wool and the newly-imposed prohibition on the 
import of French commodities would remain in force for many years to come, but also 
that the coordination of economic policy between cities in Holland would be improved 
by the formation of a ›council of commerce, manufactures and trades‹ under the aegis 
of the States of Holland and that the other provinces of the Union would refrain from 
levying duties on manufactured products from Holland.22 The recruitment of craftsmen 
and manufacturers to foreign countries or the transport of industrial equipment abroad 
should be forbidden. Industrial producers must be assisted by the establishment of an 
insurance fund. The consumption of domestic industrial products had to be encouraged 
by lowering the cost of living and by obliging all regents, offi cials and civil servants to 
wear only cloths made in Holland.23
At the time of the next war with France, starting in 1688, protectionist tendencies 
were pushed to extremes by a writer whom Etienne Laspeyres has characterized as ›the 
foremost supporter of the protective system grown out of the economic warfare against 
France‹ , the Amsterdam merchant Christopher Indiseraven.24 For the fi rst time the 
protectionist case was bolstered with ›bullionist‹ arguments. Indiseraven stressed the 
need for a rigorous and coordinated enforcement of existing import bans on French 
commodities to cut the outfl ow of ›Dutch‹ money to France and thus enable the growth 
of substitute industries and cripple the war machine of Louis XIV. In order to increase 
the money supply in the Dutch Republic for the benefi t of commerce and the conduct 
of war, he also pleaded for raising the nominal value of silver with some 5 % to divert a 
larger part of the bullion fl ow from Spain to Holland.25 During the War of the Spanish 
Succession, Indiseraven several times approached the most powerful statesman in the 
United Provinces, Pensionary of Holland Anthonie Heinsius, to suggest concrete econo-
mic means by which the French war effort might be hurt.26
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For a brief period in the middle of the seventeenth century, however, we do fi nd a few 
authors taking the economic discourse into new, divergent directions. In his Placcaet-
boeck op ‘t stuck vande lijf-tocht in 1651 Dirck Graswinckel argued that the corn trade 
of Holland should not be restricted by import or export bans, even in times of skyrok-
keting prices. The freedom of commerce should as far as possible be maintained, alt-
hough import duties were allowed. Local governments should not intervene in the trade 
by the regulation of prices; they might only be advised to build up stocks of grain for 
emergencies. Graswinckel reasoned that high grain prices and free trade were benefi cial 
for everyone, because they led to higher incomes of tenants and landowners, raised the 
revenue of the state by means of land taxes, attracted additional imports of grain and 
generally favoured the growth of Dutch commerce.27 The most far-reaching plea for 
deregulation of economic life was made by the brothers De la Court in Het Welvaren 
van Leiden en the Interest van Holland. The De la Courts argued that Holland’s wealth 
largely derived from four sources: industry, fi shery, trade and merchant-shipping. The 
level of prosperity in Holland could in their view only be maintained, if the strength of 
these sources of wealth was not stifl ed by a web of rules and regulations. The natural 
liberty of the inhabitants of Holland to seek their means of subsistence should not be 
hindered by any sort of chartered or closed company or corporate organization. Formal 
monopolies were deemed to be prejudicial to the general interest of Holland.28 The ar-
guments of the De la Courts in favour of deregulation in economic life did leave some 
traces in later economic discourse in the Netherlands itself, notably in a few pamphlets 
published around 170029, but it eventually had more infl uence at the other side of the 
North Sea, notably as we shall see, through the work of Bernard Mandeville.
2. Divergence and the Dutch Republic
Economic discourse in the Netherlands thus was more convergent with traditions in 
other countries in Europe than the advanced nature of its economy might suggest. How-
ever, this fi nding should not blind us to the fact that discursive traditions in Europe in 
many respects did diverge. While scholastic economic thinking, for example, began to 
lose its hold in France in the second half of the seventeenth century, it kept fl ourish-
ing in Spain and Italy until well into the eighteenth century.30 In the Netherlands and 
Germany, natural law theory elaborated by Grotius and Pufendorf built on scholastic 
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ideas, but developed these into new directions as well.31 As for mercantilism, Lars Ma-
gnusson has stressed that the generic term ›mercantilism‹ covered in fact a spectrum 
of ›national discourses‹, each of which showed specifi c aims and frameworks.32 The 
nature of mercantilist debates varied from country to country, and sometimes by social 
group as well. Whereas in the German variant of mercantilism (cameralism), for ex-
ample, the categories of ›economy‹ and ›polity‹ enjoyed no independent existence and 
the économie politique in France up till 1700 mainly focused on the relation between 
the state and self-suffi ciency without trying to develop general conceptions about trade 
or the economy as as separate sphere, Swedish mercantilists in the eighteenth century 
under the infl uence of Pufendorf’s theories reasoned that independent economic laws 
probably did exist but that the state should take the lead in regulating economic deve-
lopment in an orderly manner. Within the mercantilist discourse in Sweden, however, 
economic visions showed differences by social group. Economic regulation defended by 
university scholars was criticized by ›reform mercantilists‹, who expressed the views of 
special interest groups such as ironmasters.33 Mercantilism in England was according to 
Magnusson a special case in the sense that only there mercantilist discourse eventually 
gave rise to ›a science of trade‹ . It was in England in the 1690s that a number of eco-
nomic writers tried to establish ›the general principles on which an independent system 
[turning on] commerce and trade was based‹, focusing on the question ›how the market 
process in general, and increased foreign trade in particular, might increase the wealth 
and power of a national economy‹.34 
From the late seventeenth century onwards, economic discourse in the Dutch Re-
public began to differ from discursive traditions in other countries of Europe at an 
important point, too. Although the Netherlands did not witness the emergence of a ›sci-
ence of trade‹ , it showed a singular line of development in another respect. Economic 
discussions in the Netherlands after c.1700 were hardly concerned with the issues that 
formed the focal point of debate elsewhere in Europe. The question of compatibility 
between ›virtue‹ and ›commerce‹ was not a matter of controversy. The existence of com-
mercial society was not really considered to be in need of any justifi cation at all. It was 
simply accepted as a matter of course. It was assumed that the Republic owed its very 
being to the growth of commerce. Thus, economic writers in The Netherlands did not 
busy themselves with making comparisons between agrarian and commercial societies, 
contrasting the relative merits of landed versus mobile property or ruminating about 
the corrupting or mollifying infl uence of commerce on the morals in society.35
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3. Origins of convergence and divergence
How can the tendencies of convergence and divergence described above be explained? 
And why, more specifi cally, did economic discourse in the Dutch Republic at the end of 
the seventeenth century take a different turn from that in England? These are the issues 
to which I now will turn.
3.1 Origins of convergence
Cosimo Perrotta was, I think, partly right. Economic discourse in Early Modern Europe 
was in many ways still indebted to the legacy of Antiquity. The infl uence of Antiquity 
certainly remained active at the level of communication. Theologians, philosophers and 
jurists across Europe often still communicated in Latin. The persistence of Latin as a 
lingua franca in academia meant that bodies of thought that found mostly expression 
in Latin, such as scholasticism or theories of natural law, could without diffi culty travel 
from one country to another. 
Convergence between countries could also be promoted by the force of example. 
Even if communication between different countries was hampered by linguistic barri-
ers, mutual infl uence could nevertheless operate by means of policy models. The Dutch 
pamphlet I discussed above, called ‘t Verheerlickte Nederland door d’herstelde zee-
vaart, published in 1659, is an excellent case in point. Although the author did not 
betray any familiarity with mercantilist thinking in other countries of Europe, he was 
evidently well informed about the actual policies adopted by England, France, Spain 
and Portugal to protect their own economies and build an colonial empire. The strategy 
he proposed for solving the economic problems of the Netherlands was apparently di-
rectly inspired by such foreign examples. I suspect that a similar mechanism operated in 
the case of other Dutch authors arguing in a mercantilist fashion, like Willem Usselinx, 
Willem van der Voort, and Christopher Indiseraven. Convergence thus may to some 
extent have been stimulated by the exemplary effect of specifi c foreign policies rather 
than by the international transmission of ideas.
At a more fundamental level, economic discourse in Europe in the early modern 
period, despite a certain degree of autonomy, still refl ected the basic conditions of pre-
industrial society. Whatever their economic differences, all countries in Europe before 
the end of the eighteenth century shared an essential similarity, viz. that none of them 
succeeded in achieving self-sustained and accelerating growth. For all their pioneering 
contributions to the development of capitalism, even the Italian, German and Flemish 
cities in the Late Middle Ages and the Renaissance or the Dutch Republic in its Golden 
Age never managed to realize a breakthrough in production technology that permitted 
a constant growth in wealth. The emergence of capitalism did not imply a sustained in-
crease of per capita income. What several regions in Europe in fact accomplished in the 
late Middle Ages and the early modern era, like Song China before and Tokugawa Ja-
pan and Qing China in more or less the same period, was to create what the sociologist 
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and world historian Jack Goldstone has called an ›effl orescence‹ – »a relatively sharp, 
often unexpected upturn in signifi cant demographic and economic indices, usually ac-
companied by political expansion and institution building and cultural synthesis and 
consolidation«.36 This was not an uncommon occurrence in human history. Judging 
by past experience, people who lived in a ›golden age‹ of creativity and achievements 
had no reason to expect that prosperity would last forever. Growth of wealth was not 
guaranteed. Riches were never secure. It was not until the beginning of the nineteenth 
century that the Industrial Revolution in Britain at last opened the possibility of sustai-
ned economic growth.
3.2 Origins of divergence
Why, then, did any divergence in thinking about economic issues in Early Modern Eu-
rope occur at all? Economic discourse in Early Modern Europe was by no means enti-
rely wedded to the legacy of Antiquity. It was not wholly locked-in in old-established 
traditions. Changes and variations did happen in course of time.
Even if Latin did not lose its status as lingua franca in academia until the second half 
of the nineteenth century, it was already in relative decline as a medium for commu-
nication in economic discourse in the early modern period. An increasing part of the 
writings on economic subjects was composed in the vernacular. Next to the body of 
publications in Latin, there appeared a growing number of books, pamphlets or tracts 
written in Italian, French, Spanish, English, Portuguese, Dutch, German, Swedish, or 
other languages. The increased use of the vernacular may have eased communication 
within a given country. The fl ip side of this shift from a single, universal language to a 
multitude of tongues, however, was a loss in intelligibility in communication between 
countries. Latin used to be understood by every educated person in Europe, but know-
ledge of French, English or Dutch was geographically much more skewed. 
The growing linguistic diversity implied that the circle of people who could be ac-
quainted with particular texts, in case these texts were composed in the vernacular, was 
to a greater extent restricted to specifi c countries than if these texts had been written 
in Latin. Writings on mercantilism and political economy, which mostly appeared in 
the vernacular, therefore travelled much less easily from one country to another than 
scholastic texts or publciations on natural law. 
Knowledge of English, for example, was before 1700 outside the British Isles much 
more rare than today. It is therefore not to be expected that in the seventeenth century 
many people on the Continent were actually reading the English texts that nowadays 
often fi gure as early specimens of political economy or typical examples of reasoning 
in the mercantilist vein. In the Dutch Republic, there was a wide-spread ignorance of 
the English language and English books as late as the end of the seventeenth century. 
91Economic Discourse in Europe between Scholasticism and Mandeville
37 C. W. Schoneveld: Intertraffi c of the Mind. Studies in Seventeenth-Century Anglo-Dutch Trans-
latin with a Checklist of Books translated from English into Dutch, 1600–1700, Leiden 1983, 118, 
123–129.
38 J. Lucassen: »Het Welvaren van Leiden (1659–1662): de wording van een economische theorie 
over gilden en ondernemerschap«, in: Boudien de Vries et. al. (eds): De kracht der zwakken. Studies over 
arbeid en arbeidersbeweging in het verleden, Amsterdam 1992, 13–48, 35.
39 W. Th. M. Frijhoff, M. Spies: 1650. Bevochten eendracht, The Hague 1999, 234.
40 W. Th. M Frijhoff: La société néerlandaise et ses gradués, 1575–1814, Amsterdam 1981, 60, 
85 f., 383; A. Frank-van Westrienen: De Groote Tour. Tekening der educatiereis der Nederlanders in de 
zeventiende eeu, Amsterdam 1983, 145–50.
41 E. O. G. Haitsma Mulier: The Myth of Venice and Dutch Republican Thought in the Seventeenth 
Century, Assen 1980, 54; A. Frank-van Westrienen: De Groote Tour (op. cit.), 164–169.
42 E. Taverne: In’t land van belofte: in de nieue stadt. Ideaal en werkelijkheid van de stadsuitleg in 
de Republiek 1580–1680, Maarssen 1978, 346, 463 note 60.
Institutional facilities for learning English did not yet exist. The vast majority of English 
titles that appeared in Dutch translation, i. e. 75 to 80 %, were religious writings.37 One 
looks in vain for translations of Gerard de Malynes’ The maintenance of free trade, Ed-
ward Misselden’s The circle of commerce or the balance of trade, Thomas Culpepper’s 
A tract of usury, Thomas Mun’s England’s treasure by forraign trade, Josiah Child’s 
Brief observations concerning trade and interest of money or William Petty’s Political 
arithmetick. Thus, debates on economic subjects in England were in the Dutch Repu-
blic at the time apparently not widely known. The networks of economic discourse in 
these two countries before 1700 appear to have been, at least from the Dutch side, only 
tangentially connected..
Knowledge of French and Italian was in the seventeenth Netherlands defi nitely much 
more common than that of English. Even the brothers Johan and Pieter de la Court, 
who did understand English, only sparingly used English in their books Het Welvaren 
van Leiden and Interest van Holland. The number of expressions and quotations in 
English (2 and 1, respectively) actually paled into insignifi cance beside those in French 
(15 and 8) and Italian (18 and 12), let alone those in Latin (116 and 72).38 French was 
at the time the second language in nearly all cities in Holland, thanks in part to the 
infl ux of refugees from Wallonia at the end of the sixteenth century and of Huguenots 
a century later. Instruction in French could be received at so-called ›French schools‹, 
at a number of grammar schools and in classes offered in private.39 A visit to France 
during a Grand Tour, including a brief stay at a university in the Loire region, was in 
the seventeenth century a regular part of the education of scions of the Dutch elite.40 
Many Dutchmen, having studied in Padova or having visited Italy on their Grand Tour, 
were conversant with Italian, too.41 Thus the odds are that educated people in the 
Netherlands before the eighteenth century were more familiar with economic discourse 
in Mediterranean countries than that in the British Isles. In contrast with English mer-
cantilist tracts, works by Giovanni Botero, for example, were in the Dutch Republic 
quite well-known.42
Within individual countries, linguistic diversity was to some extent intertwined with 
differentiation between social groups. Economic discourse in the early modern period 
differed not only from that in the Middle Ages in a gradual shift from Latin to the 
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vernacular, but also in the increased variation of the social background of the partici-
pants. Next to the jurists, theologians and philosophers who traditionally set the tone 
in discussions on economic topics, other groups, notably merchants, administrators and 
›projectors‹, began to their make their voices heard as well. Early political economists in 
England, such as Gerard de Malynes, Edward Misselden, Thomas Mun, Josiah Child, 
and Charles Davenant, belonged to these very groups.43 The same applied to several 
leading economic writers in the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic, such as Willem 
Usselinx, Johan and Pieter de la Court, Willem van der Voort, Arend Tollenaer, and 
Christopher Indiseraven, and to the author of an early mercantilist tract in the Spanish 
Netherlands, Pierre Cardon, a merchant from Ghent.44 In the Iberian Peninsula, admi-
nistrators, ›projectors‹ and the odd member of the merchant class in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century became actively involved in debates on subjects that were formerly 
the preserve of university doctores.45 In contrast with the traditional discussants, these 
newcomers expressed their views commonly in the vernacular rather than Latin. 
Connections between circles of discourse in different countries could exist, to be 
sure, even if the knowledge of each other’s language was not very widespread and 
translations were rare. There were after all always some individuals who did have a 
command of several foreign languages and act as a kind of cultural mediator. And mer-
chants, administrators and ›projectors‹ were not all ignorant of Latin either. The mer-
cator sapiens was more than a rhetorical topos. The brothers De la Court, professional 
cloth merchants who were able to intersperse their texts with quotations and expressi-
ons in Latin, were no exception. Grain merchant Joost Willemsz van Nieukerck, who 
in 1630 and 1631 published some tracts arguing that the formation of a Dutch Mus-
covy Company would be an effective means to combat high buying prices in Russia, 
was well-versed in classical sources, too.46 Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, a substantial part of the mercantile elites in the Dutch Republic not only at-
tended a grammar school but also received a university education (most often, in law), 
although the relative importance of an education in Latin and a university training after 
1700 showed a tendency to decline.47 In Italian cities, grammar schools, which offered 
instruction in Latin, became in the seventeenth century progressively more important in 
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the education of merchants than abacus schools, which emphasized training in practical 
subjects.48 A background in the humanities was assumed to be an valuable part of the 
formation of commercial elites. In France, by contrast, merchants showed themselves 
by the second half of the seventeenth century already quite hostile to instruction in the 
classics.49 Networks of discourse in Latin and the vernacular thus could be connected 
and even to some extent overlap, but the degree of connection varied by country and 
by period.
3.3. The Dutch Republic and England compared
Economic discourse in the Dutch Republic showed signs of divergence from discursive 
traditions in other countries of Europe but it produced no ›science of trade‹ as in Eng-
land. How, fi nally, can this difference in development between these two countries be 
explained? The renewal in economic thought in the Netherlands starting in the middle 
of the seventeenth century was aided by the circumstance that the spheres of authority 
of the government and the Reformed church were at that time more clearly demarca-
ted than before. In the Placcaet-boeck op ‘t stuck vande lijf-tocht, Dirck Graswinckel 
openly challenged the right of ›scholastic theologians‹ to meddle with the government 
of the Republic. Theologians had no right to lay down the law for public authorities, 
he argued, even if it were the law of Moses.50 The States of Holland and the States of 
Gelderland took the very same point of view a few years later, when, in 1658, they 
abruptly put and end to the debate on usury by decreeing that the Reformed Church 
should not make any rules about the question whether charging interest was admissible 
or not. The matter came solely within the jurisdiction of the public authorities, not 
within that of the Church.51 
The restriction of the sphere of competence of the Reformed Church did not imply, 
meanwhile, that the public debate in the Dutch Republic was not longer bound by any 
rules at all. Local, provincial and central governments were perfectly willing and able 
to curtail the freedom of speech and the press, if particular discussions or publications 
were deemed to form a threat to the public authorities themselves or against religion as 
such. For this very reason, the government of Amsterdam in 1662 forbade Franciscus 
van der Ende to hold disputations, the States of Holland in 1674 prohibited the Dutch 
edition of Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan and the authorities of Rotterdam in 1693 banned 
physician Michael Mandeville from the city because of his involvement with the publi-
cation of a series of lampoons aimed at the powerful, vicious bailiff Jacob van Zuijlen 
van Nijevelt. His son, Bernard, left Rotterdam at the same time under a cloud as well.52 
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Yet, the relative tolerance for dissenting opinions in mid-seventeenth century Holland 
had long-lasting consequences. When Bernard Mandeville left Rotterdam and then the 
United Provinces altogether, he had in the circle of his own family and political friends 
and during his student days in Leiden already undergone the infl uence of the theories 
of the De la Court and of Cartesian thinking. As E. J. Hundert and Harold Cook have 
pointed out, it was the work of De la Courts and Descartes’ Passions de l’âme that 
taught Mandeville that ›although the passions control human behaviour, they can lead 
to the [general] good even when individuals are not governed by reason‹.53 
However, Mandeville’s thought eventually blossomed in England rather than in the 
Netherlands and his country of origin did not see the rise of substitute Mandevilles. 
This was no accident. After the Glorious Revolution, the Dutch immigrant community 
in England substantially grew. Dutch immigrants for more than fi fty years played a 
disproportionately large role in the commercial and fi nancial life of London.54 Apart 
from Mandeville, this immigrant community included several other people who made a 
vocal contribution to economic discourse in England, too, notably merchants Matthew 
Decker and Jacob Vanderlint.55 It was in this very period that several English transla-
tions appeared of Pieter de la Court’s forceful plea for deregulation in economic life, 
fi rst published in Dutch in 1662, called Interest van Holland.56 Moreover, England had 
by the end of the seventeenth century already witnessed the emergence of ›a science of 
trade‹ . The growth of this ›science of trade‹ was linked to a long series of economic 
discussions, starting in the 1620s, arising – in Charles Wilson’s words – ›from compe-
ting private interests and from attempts to reconcile the demands of the mercantile inte-
rests in the State with needs deemed to be those in of the Commonwealth as a whole‹.57 
It was not a foregone conclusion that the East-India interest, the Levant interest, the 
Hudson Bay interest or any other sectoral interest would reign supreme. In the Dutch 
Republic, by contrast, the degree of competition between sectoral interests was much 
lower, as the interests of East-India Company and the grain merchants clearly enjoyed 
predominance, and the priority of mercantile interests in the State as a whole was for a 
long time widely accepted.58 And this lack of competition between sectoral interest may, 
in the fi nal analysis, have hampered the evolution of Dutch economic discourse into the 
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direction explored in England. Thus, the ambience for Mandeville’s ideas was in the 
early eighteenth century more favorable in England than in the Dutch Republic. 
 
Conclusion
This article has looked at tendencies of convergence and divergence in economic dis-
course in Europe between the heyday of Scholasticism and the rise of Mandeville and 
more specifi cally at the position of the Dutch Republic therein. Convergence in econo-
mic thinking in many ways proved to be stronger than disparities in economic perfor-
mance. Economic discourse in the most advanced capitalist economy of the day, viz. the 
Dutch Republic, turned out not to be signifi cantly different from discursive traditions 
in other European countries. On the other hand, the degree of variation in economic 
discourse in Europe that emerged in the early modern period was in fact greater than 
Cosimo Perrotta has suggested. Economic thought between c.1500 and 1700 began 
to show increasing divergence by country, language and social group. However, the 
divergence that actually occured was not related to the rate or the level of economic 
development either. A comparative analysis of the Netherlands and England proved 
that the explanation can primarily be found in a combination of cultural factors and 
socio-political conditions.
